Abstract-There is a universal meaning for studying the contract negotiations to improve the performance of the supply chain structure, which consists of competing multimanufacturers and an independent and common retailer. Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power, a Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers, was established. Then, Proofs for the game between manufacturers' production strategies existing a unique optimal symmetric nash equilibrium solution, and parameters' game on the revenue-sharing contracts existing a unique equilibrium solution, were provided. The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain under revenuesharing contracts was discussed. The impacts of system parameters and products' substitutability level on the supply chain performance were further analyzed and verified through a simulation experiment at last.
.
INTRODUCTION
It is common that multiple competing manufacturers sell their products through a retailer. This relationship is also universal in the traditional distribution channel and the supply chain structure under E-Commerce. The retailer has stronger bargaining power under the supply structure with competing manufacturers.
Recently, researchers have more interests in studying contract problems to coordinate decentralized supply chain [1] . The revenue-sharing contract is more important method to solve the coordinated problem. This contract form means that the partners of the supply chain rationally allocate their revenues in the end of sales period to share marketing risk and improve the supply chain performance. As a new supply chain coordination method, the revenue-sharing contract first emerged in the video rentals industry, and then was focused by the industrial and theory researchers. Dana and Spier [2] study the revenue-sharing contract in the video rentals industry, which report that the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the system with competing retailers. Z. Yao et al. [3] analyze the revenue-sharing contract's effect on the supply chain performance through comparing with wholesale price contract. Cachon and Lariviere [4] characterize revenue-sharing contract parameters by wholesale price and sharing coefficient. Veen and Venugopal [5] research win-to-win problems under revenue-sharing contract.
Research papers mentioned above are all focus on the settings with a single manufacturer and one or more retailers, and the retailer's reservation profit is assumed to be an exogenous constant that reflects the retailer's bargaining power. However, in our structure with competing manufacturers, the retailer's reservation profit is endogenous. Up to now, there received limited attention on contract research in the setting with competing manufacturers. [6] [7] just consider wholesale price contracts. [8] discusses quantity-discount contracts. But all these contracts forms are driven by manufacturers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the problem and establishes the model. Section Ⅲ presents decision in the centralized supply chain. Section Ⅳ analyzes the wholesale price contract and Stackelberge game of revenue-sharing contracts under the supply chain structure with competing manufacturers. Section Ⅴ compares the relationship between the centralized supply chain and the decentralized supply chain. Section Ⅵ discusses and verifies the impacts of contracts' parameters and products' substitution on supply chain performance. The final section concludes this paper.
Ⅱ. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND MODEL FOUNDATION This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts under the two-echelon supply chain system with two competing manufacturers and a common retailer. We consider that two competing manufacturers sell partial substitutive products through a independent and common retailer. The retailer faces a deterministic, price sensitive demand in a single sales period, These profit levels are respectively the maximum profit the system earns, if it were to carry only product1, only product 2 and both products. We assume 12ˆ0
, which implies that it is always optimal for the system to carry both products. So the profit function for the centralized supply chain is Ⅳ. DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN Under the decentralized supply chain structure, the two partners aren't concerned about the whole supply chain profit, but for their own profit. In this section, we assume the manufacturers and the retailer are risk neutral.
A. Decision Analysis under the Wholesale Price Contracts
We use the wholesale price contracts as the benchmark for the decision problem. After the manufacturers provide the wholesale price contracts, the retailer decides the purchasing quantities from each manufacturer according to the provision of the contracts for maximizing his reaction function. 
B. Decision Analysis under the Retailer Driven Revenuesharing Contracts
In the first stage of the game, the retailer as the leader of the stackelberg game, announces the contract offers. We assume that particular contractual form offered is established before the game begins. In the second stage, given functions 1 T and 2 T , the manufacturers choose their production quantities. In the following sections, we solve the problem by using backward induction. We analyze the game between the manufacturers first and then the retailer's decision.
Game Analysis between Manufacturers
In this section we assume the retailer offer the revenuesharing contract, then discuss the game equilibrium between manufacturers. Each manufacturer chooses its own best response ( ) 
(6) 
From (14), we can find that manufacturer i 's production quantity has relationship with every contracts' provision, then is increasing in i w , and decreasing in j w .
Decision Analysis on the Retailer
Anticipating manufacturers' production quantity, the retailer designs the optimal contract strategy. . Hence, we have increasing reaction functions with a slope less than1. This implies that there is a unique equilibrium of the contract game.
Ⅴ. DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION We study the decentralized supply chain coordination problem for maximizing the whole profit of the supply chain based on balancing the two parts' benefits. In our paper, it refers that the manufacturers' optimal production quantity incentive by revenue-sharing contracts is equal to the purchasing quantity in centralized supply chain, where *= By (7), (13), (18), we obtain 
Ⅵ. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. Simulation Experiment
Two car manufacturers compete for the same market through a big car supermarket. We extract system parameters from the actual data as This result is the same to [3] . It illustrates that revenuesharing contracts driven by the retailer can coordinate supply chain and improve the whole performance .
Contract performance（
r m π π ）denotes the allocation relationship on realized profits between the retailer and the manufacturers [9] . From table 2, under the same marketing condition ( the same γ ), supply chain's coordination level is increasing in φ . During the whole process, the retailer gets the more increased profits, while the manufacturers get lower profits. A main reason is that we assume the retailer as the stackelberg leader. The provisions of contracts are designed by the retailer. Therefore, the retailer driven revenue-sharing contracts aren't win-to-win strategy for the supply chain system with competing manufacturers.
Products substitution effect
As table 2 represents, in the same revenue-sharing ratio, the competition between manufacturers is more aggressive with higher substitute level. The competition directly results in the whole supply chain's performance decreasing. The channel performance and the contract performance both decrease in higher substitute level under the competing manufacturers.
Ⅶ. CONCLUSIONS This paper is a first attempt to consider revenuesharing contracts other than wholesale-price contracts in systems with multiple competing manufacturers and single common retailer. Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power, a Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers, is established. Then, we prove that production quantity game between competing manufacturers exists a unique optimal symmetric nash equilibrium, and the retailer's decision parameters exist unique equilibrium solution. We analyze the coordinated relationship between centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain. At last, we discuss and verify the effect of contracts parameters and products' substitution, on the supply chain performance. It is universal meaning to study contracts negotiation management under the competing manufacturers environment. But there are still some shortages that we just 
consider linear demand and symmetric manufacturers. Stochastic demand and asymmetric manufacturers will be studied in the future research. Additional, there are more bread research area to study the supply chain structure with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers. 
